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 4      Executive summary 
Executive summary 
This report summarises the outputs from a series of four seminars held at the 
Institute for Government between February and May 2012, organised in collaboration 
with the Alliance for Useful Evidence and the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research. The starting point was the finding in the Institute’s 2011 report that 
despite years attempting to make policy more evidence based, this was still seen to 
be an area of weakness by both ministers and civil servants. The aim of the seminars 
was to explore both the changing nature of the evidence landscape but also to look 
at the barriers on both the supply and demand sides to better use of evidence and 
evaluation in policy making.  
Speakers pointed to the changing evidence possibilities. Rigorous experimental 
techniques, such as randomisation were now being applied successfully to test 
insights on a range of policies. There were also options to learn from ‘natural 
experiments’ in other places and past attempts at reform. The opening up of 
government data meant that there were new possibilities for non-government actors 
to get involved in analysing and scrutinising government policy – and the internet 
was enabling low cost citizen feedback on services as well as a more rapid means of 
holding government to account.   
Nonetheless, a range of supply and demand barriers were identified, standing in the 
way of more systematic use of evidence and evaluation. Past reports focused on the 
supply side, assuming that this was where the principal blockage lay. On the supply 
side significant remaining barriers were:  
• Research is not timely enough in providing answers to relevant policy 
questions; and some academics find it difficult to engage effectively with the 
policy process despite their expertise and potential contribution.  
• Many of the issues with which government deals are not suited to the most 
rigorous testing but, even where they were, policies were often designed in a 
way that did not allow for proper evaluation.  
• A lack of good usable data to provide the basis for research both within and 
outside government. There was also a risk that new forms of feedback might 
bias policy making compared to more rigorous data – due in part to differential 
access to feedback mechanisms. 
But most of the participants thought that in practice the demand barriers were more 
significant – and these affected ministers, civil servants and other public service 
providers. Underlying this was the thought that both incentives and culture of these 
key groups militate against more rigorous use of evidence and evaluation. The key 
demand barriers identified were:  
  Executive summary      5 
• Problems with the timeliness and helpfulness of evidence and the mismatch 
between political timetables and the timelines of the evidence producers allied 
to ethical reservations about experimentation. 
• The fact that many political decisions were driven by values rather than 
outcomes – and that sometimes the ‘evidence-driven’ answer brought 
significant political risk 
• The lack of culture and skills for using rigorous evidence in the civil service.  
• A need to create openness to feedback among other service providers. 
Some speakers thought that the Treasury had a potential role to play in changing 
incentives by more explicitly linking spending decisions to evidence; external 
scrutineers and local commissioners were other potential new sources of demand 
pressure.  
But a number of speakers highlighted the role external ‘evidence institutions’ had 
played in addressing the ‘time inconsistencies’ policy makers often faced. At our last 
session we heard from the heads of three such institutions – the Dutch Central 
Planning Bureau, set up shortly after the Second World War in the Netherlands with 
a remit to evaluate both government and opposition party policies, the Office for 
Budget Responsibility and the Education Endowment Foundation established by the 
coalition. Drawing on these examples a number of design principles for evidence 
institutions emerged:  
• Institutions need independence and credibility to perform this function.  One 
way to establish independence and credibility is through longevity. 
• Transparency is a critical part of that reputation building.  
• Resourcing models also need to underline that independence. 
• They need to be able to access both internal government information and 
draw on – or create – a robust evidence base.    
• They need to be clearly linked into the policy process.  
The seminars did not attempt to come to a conclusion. But looking at the discussions 
there are changes that can be made to the incentives of the players in the system to 
increase the use of evidence and evaluation – including the creation of external 
evidence institutions. But real change will come when politicians see evidence and 
evaluation as ways of helping them entrench policies. 
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1. Introduction 
“Do we think it will work? Sure I think it will work. And if you ask me for evidence, my 
evidence is the whole history of the world. It’s not a question of getting some 
academic in some tower to use some absurd system of statistical regression to prove 
some point. I know, and you know, and we all know actually if we are honest, that on 
the whole if you have a lot of people who are making choices for themselves and 
there are people who are competing to provide for them, and they are doing so in a 
way where they are accountable to you, they are more likely to do it better then 
under any other system. Not perfect – very far from that. But better. That’s what we 
believe. I’ve always believed that, I will go on believing that and I think that the 
history of the world shows it [to be true].” 
Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP, now Minister for Government Policy, speaking at the 
Institute for Government, January 2010 
“Rigour matters. There’s what you think you know, and when you go and look at 
something carefully and rigorously sometime we learn that our gut reactions and 
conventional wisdom are wrong. Sometimes things we think are working aren’t 
working, and things that we think aren’t working, are working.”  
Dr Rachel Glennerster, Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action 
Laboratory at MIT speaking at the Institute for Government, February 2012 
In our report, Policy Making in the Real World1 (2011), evaluation, review and 
learning scored bottom of both ministers’ and civil servants’ assessment of how 
policy making measured up against the characteristics of good policy making set out 
in the Cabinet Office’s 1999 Modernising Government White paper. That was despite 
12 years of efforts to promote better use of evidence and evaluation in policy making.   
Together with the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and the 
Alliance for Useful Evidence, established by NESTA, ESRC and BIG Lottery, the 
Institute for Government hosted a series of four seminars looking at this issue from 
different perspectives. Speakers at the events are listed in the annex to the 
document.  
The first seminar looked at the possibilities for more rigorous testing of policies 
emerging with the ‘randomisation revolution’; in the second we looked from the end 
of those who would use evidence and evaluation to make decisions within 
government and opposition; in the third we examined the emergence of new sorts of 
evidence and scrutiny with ‘armchair evaluators’ offering new ways for people to 
                                              
1 Michael Hallsworth, Simon Parker and Jill Rutter, Institute for Government, April 2011.  This 
report provides the evidence and analysis base for our recommendations report:  Michael 
Hallsworth and Jill Rutter, Making Policy Better, Institute for Government, April 2011.  
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engage with the policy making process and in the fourth we studied the role 
institutional change could play in increasing the availability and use of evidence and 
evaluation on a more systematic basis. Meeting reports are available at 
www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk. The Alliance for Useful Evidence, NIESR and 
IFG are very grateful both to all the participants in our seminars, but also to the very 
lively and engaged audiences who attended, and to the great team at IfG who made 
them such a success.  
The last government was committed – in theory – to evidence based policy making. 
Tony Blair is quoted as pointing to a post-ideological world in which “what matters is 
what works”. Despite Oliver Letwin’s remarks above, the Cabinet Office, where he is 
a minister is now looking at whether establishing a “what works” institute and this 
now features in the Civil Service Reform Plan2. The recently published Geek 
Manifesto3 goes further arguing for a new “office for scientific responsibility” to 
oversee the use of scientific evidence in government on the lines of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility. The Cabinet Office’s behavioural insights team is doing 
pioneering work in applying randomised control trials to develop policy4. The new 
civil service reform plan also puts the onus on permanent secretaries to “challenge 
policies which do not have a sound base in evidence or practice”.5  
But despite these positive developments, there remains a gap between aspiration 
and practice. The seminars were designed to shed light on the explanations for that 
gap and the purpose of this short report is to pull together some of the key themes 
emerging from those sessions about how use of evidence and evaluation might be 
better embedded in the policy making system.   
It looks first at the ‘supply’ side and both the potential for evidence and evaluation to 
influence policy making and at the supply barriers which might need to be addressed 
if that potential is to be fully exploited. 
Past reports, like the Cabinet Office’s Adding It Up report6 – saw the under use of 
evidence as a predominantly supply side issue. At one seminar an author of that 
report noted it devoted 11 chapters to dealing with improving the supply of evidence 
to decision makers and only one to looking at increasing demand for evidence. The 
assumption was that supply would create its own demand. But in our seminars, lack 
                                              
2 HM Government, Civil Service Reform Plan, June 2012  
3 Mark Henderson, The Geek Manifesto, May 2012 
4 Laura Haynes, Owain Service, Ben Goldacre and David Togerson, Test, Learn, Adapt: 
Developing Public Policy Using Randomised Control Trials, Cabinet Office behavioural insights 
team, June 2012 
5 HM Government,  Civil Service Reform Plan, June 2012 p.17 
6 Performance and Innovation Unit, Adding It Up, January 2000 accessed at 
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6321/2/coiaddin.pdf 
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of demand for evidence and analysis from senior decision makers emerged as a very 
significant issue. So the second section of the paper investigates what emerged as 
the key issues constraining the ‘demand’ side.  
There have been a number of examples, both in the UK and abroad of the use of 
more independent ‘evidence’ institutions to both increase the ‘supply’ of useable 
evidence but also to act as a discipline on government to ensure better use of 
evidence. In the third section, we look at different models of such institutions and 
draw some general institutional design lessons.  
In the concluding section we briefly look at what changes might promote better use of 
evidence and evaluation in policy making. These are not intended to be conclusive 
but rather our aim is to provoke further debate and discussion.  
1.1. What evidence?  
The term evidence covers a wide spectrum: from randomised control trials to ‘natural 
experiments’ which look at the impacts of policies elsewhere for transferable lessons, 
and can be synthesised to inform decision-making, ‘learning from the mistakes of 
others’, to newly emerging ‘qualitative’ feedback from citizens which open the way 
both to change policy and ‘collaborative co-design’ of services.   
It is also possible to distinguish between two phases of evidence (which merge into 
each other): pre-existing “evidence” which can help inform decisions and post-
intervention evaluations which look at the impacts of policy and whether it is having 
the desired impact and what the unintended consequences might be. Well-designed 
evaluations can then inform the future evidence base.  
Our speakers agreed that there were multiple types of evidence – but also that it was 
important to be able to differentiate between the uses and usefulness of different 
types of evidence that would be available. As Rachel Glennerster put it: “randomised 
trials are only ever going to be one part of the evidence base. We need to be more 
educated about the quality of evidence...when we have burning questions we can’t 
sit there and wait 30 years to get the next randomised trial. We’ve got to use the 
evidence we have. But we have to be sophisticated and educated about how we use 
that evidence. We mustn’t use anecdote and think that an anecdote is the same as a 
well done quasi-experiment which is the same as a well done RCT (randomised 
control trial).”   
There was a general agreement that there was a huge amount of value for analysts 
in Whitehall and external academic advisers in simply being on top of the existing 
evidence base – and being able to synthesise it rapidly for ministers when they 
became interested in an issue. There was clearly huge value in anticipating that 
demand in advance. A former chief economist saw it as an important role for the 
analysts “departmental analysts should be putting effort into knowing the best 
summary of what the evidence is at the moment”. But although it “sounds very 
obvious thing to do, [it was] a hell of a struggle”. The importance of being able to do 
good syntheses was also emphasised by Coen Teulings, director of the Dutch 
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Central Planning Bureau. In their case they would also subject their syntheses to 
peer review: “if we do a report with evaluations of all kinds of education policies, we 
discuss that with leading scientists on those issues in the field... we would be very 
hesitant to publish such an evaluation if we did not have an agreement among major 
education professors in the Netherlands. We know we would get killed first.”   
Geoff Mulgan pointed to a new emerging evidence landscape: “the whole world of 
evidence, like so many other fields, is a moment of fluidity of competition. Very 
different models of learning are out there, with many, as it were, amateur or citizen 
evaluators and users of data. In one vision of the next few years, the provision of 
much more public data – administrative data as well as outcomes data – spawns an 
industry, a society, of armchair evaluators who analyse things, spot patterns, lobby 
and completely change the way in which politics and policy is done”.   
A picture emerged of increasing potential for evidence to be used to make policy 
better – but with barriers standing in the way of realising that potential. It is to those 
barriers we turn in the next two sections.  
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2.  A problem of supply? 
“ I find it difficult to think of a major social policy area in the UK where you can say 
‘we’re doing [it] this way because a randomised control trial told us that worked and 
something else didn’t’ which is fundamentally rather depressing” Jonathan Portes, 
Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.  
The argument for more systematic use of evidence can be simply made – it enables 
a more rigorous approach to policy making, but also allows adaptation as 
interventions or services have effects – intended or unintended.  
But despite the potential identified and already being realised in some areas, there 
was a clear view emerging in our seminars that supply could be improved if some of 
the barriers identified in discussion were addressed. The major ones identified were:   
 Research is not timely enough in providing answers to relevant policy 
questions; and some academics find it difficult to engage effectively with the 
policy process despite their expertise and potential contribution  
 Many of the issues with which government deals are not suited to the most 
rigorous testing but, even where they were, policies were often designed in 
a way that did not allow for proper evaluation.  
 A lack of good useable data to provide the basis for research both within and 
outside government. There was also a risk that new forms of feedback might 
bias policy making compared to more rigorous data – due in part to 
differential access to feedback mechanisms 
 
2.1. Research relevance and academic engagement 
On the first, Rachel Glennerster bemoaned the past failure of the academic research 
and evaluation community to provide relevant evidence when she was a policy 
maker in the Treasury in the earlier part of her career – this was part of her 
motivation for subsequent work to on providing just that sort of evidence: “as a policy 
maker I was always looking for the evidence to support what we should do and being 
very disappointed that the academic community hadn’t provided the answer for me”. 
But the work of the Poverty Lab showed how valuable rigorous policy 
experimentation could be – whether on testing the effectiveness of microcredit (to 
overcome self-selection bias) or why African farmers were resistant to using fertiliser, 
despite the very high returns.   
When research was available, it too often was not focused on current problems. A 
senior civil servant explained that in a department he had worked in: ““we spent 
billions on research... we got really high quality papers but it was always felt they 
were answering yesterday’s question tomorrow.” Evidence from research was 
inevitably “backward-looking” and out of synch with ministerial timetables. These 
concerns put a premium on being able to anticipate areas of future demand – both by 
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researchers in academia but also by those in charge of departmental research 
budgets.  
There was also concern that research was too removed from what was going on on 
the ground. There was a lack of “a culture of connection between the research 
communities and people on the frontline...who have an intuitive understanding of 
what works.”   
It was clear from many of the government speakers that they saw real potential value 
in external experts who could engage directly with the policy process – including 
being put in front of ministers. But there was also a sense academics who could 
engage were rather thin on the ground. If they could be found they were “like gold 
dust”. A former chief analyst gave advice to his colleagues: “there are some good 
academics out there,who know their stuff, think rigorously and understand the policy 
process. They can engage in a personal and very immediate sense senior people 
including ministers. If you’re lucky enough to have some of those academics out 
there, make the most of them.”   
For academics this means both developing the relationships in order to influence 
policy – before the question is asked. It also means recognising the need for agility in 
being prepared to respond to the issues that are politically current. Often what policy 
makers value most is the ability of academics to provide general expert advice to 
help them think through and frame an issue and act as a guide to the state of current 
thinking as an input into policy making rather than a specific piece of research.  
 
2.2. Untested and untestable policies 
One of the reasons for the lack of good systematic evidence on what works is a 
reluctance to test policies in the past. A senior Whitehall analyst pointed to the fact 
that there was a “long history of piloting things” but that “of every ten pilots one was 
[able to be evaluated]… but they could have all been done better by designing in 
evaluation from the beginning”. However at a session we heard about a recent 
example of a policy that was tested out against a control group, found (counter-
intuitively) not to have an impact and abandoned as a consequence. Recent work by 
the behavioural insights team has been tested rigorously as part of their ‘Test, Learn 
and Adapt’ model. Some speakers pointed out that a limitation of existing 
government evaluations was the lack of a standardised form – which meant it was 
difficult for subsequent researchers to use them. 
But Coen Teulings of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau pointed out that some 
issues were much easier to subject to rigorous evaluation than others. In the Dutch 
system, the CPB is available to evaluate party manifesto pledges before elections, 
an offer taken up by all but a couple of single member fringe parties. This meant 
parties were often reluctant to propose reforms – such as the introduction of market 
mechanisms into public services – where the CPB could not give a tick of approval. 
He noted: “the strange thing is that we bias the political debate towards proposals 
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that are easily evaluated.” There was some debate about how feasible it was to 
evaluate big scale system change. Rachel Glennerster thought it was unacceptable 
to make major scale reforms like the NHS reforms without trying to test in advance. 
She thought there was ““too much national experimentation – experimenting on the 
population without the evidence”. But this view was not universally shared: Jonathan 
Portes saw some real difficulties in testing system changes where behavioural 
responses depended on whether people thought the changes would be sustained or 
not. In a separate report, Testing new commissioning models, the Institute for 
Government7 has looked at different ways of piloting and testing market reforms.  
Jonathan thought there might be another reason why there was relatively little formal 
testing of policy interventions in developed countries – that the sort of problems 
these governments were dealing with were less likely to show clear-cut results from 
an intervention, than, for example, distributing bednets to reduce malaria in sub-
Saharan Africa: the argument could be made that “social policy in developed 
countries is not so bad really and the gains from a particular intervention not likely to 
be sufficiently large to justify having an RCT over a long period”.   
Those commissioning and hoping to learn from evaluation had to be prepared to 
wait. Hasan Bakhshi illustrated why it was important for experiments to be 
maintained in place for some time and longitudinal data collected. The initial results 
of NESTA’s Creative Credits experiment showed a highly positive effect for SMEs 
which benefited from consultancy support from creative service businesses 
compared with the control group. Stopping the experiment at that stage would have 
concluded that this was a programme worth rolling out just as it had been designed. 
But those benefits decayed rapidly thereafter, such that as the programme ran on it 
did not offer significant benefits. Too often the political temptation would be to seize 
on earlier positive results and scale up a programme without waiting for the long-term 
results to come through. This could have major implications for programme design, 
while opponents or sceptics could potentially seize on early negative results without 
waiting to see longer run benefits. Hasan pointed out that: “Policy makers in cases 
like this can make severely biased inferences when they base it on short-term data 
and not go further out”. This point was echoed by Kevan Collins, Chief Executive of 
the newly established Education Endowment Foundation, who pointed out that there 
is “still an instinctive belief you can do it quickly... [there is an] imperative to solve 
problems right now. Education policy is littered with reforms of good intentions 
without evidence”.  
A related issue was the ability to define the question in a way that could be tested. 
With big amorphous policies, defining the question was an important element in 
developing a testable proposition. Rachel Glennerster explained how crucial –and 
helpful – this stage was. She argued that the practitioner community not good 
enough at “chunking up” problems to make them amenable to testing. Instead the 
more natural reaction was to accept it was not possible rather than working out what 
                                              
7 Kate Blatchford and Tom Gash, Institute for Government, March 2012 
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parts of the policy could be tested. PovertyLab sometimes took as much as six 
months working with policy makers to define the question. She explained the value in 
spending time getting the question right: “that time and thinking isn’t wasted – it’s not 
just for the randomised trial, it’s what you are trying to achieve, what do we already 
know, what are the factors that you can and can’t change”.  
But another speaker pointed out that defining the question could expose a difference 
in objectives. Sometimes ministers and civil servants thought that the policy they 
were introducing was answering different questions. A minister could see value in the 
process, whereas a civil servant might be looking to see what outcome it produced. 
There was a “real danger that [when] we look at ‘what works’ we will often jump over 
what the objective is and what the ‘what works’ means. ...what I failed to pick out was 
that there was a difference between what we analysts meant by what works and 
what [my secretary of state] meant”. And another speaker pointed out that often 
policy interventions were not about achieving an outcome or outcomes as such but 
about “redistributing power”. 
Not all decisions government make can be reduced to testable chunks. For some 
policies, where governments have to make a binary decision whether to take a 
course or not, some ex ante testing of likely public reaction was possible. Nadhim 
Zahawi MP gave an example from his time at YouGov when they used a citizen 
panel to simulate public reaction to a campaign on a regional elected assembly. 
When the proposition was put to the panel cold, they were instinctively in favour, but 
when they were subjected to a simulated campaign they changed their minds and 
opposed the idea: “we took the sample through the arguments, effectively mimicking 
a campaign. Then we saw an enormous shift from support towards disapproval”.   
2.3. Good, useable and unbiased data  
The third significant but rather ‘prosaic’ barrier identified was the “lack of good 
administrative data linked across different systems and even different departments”. 
Politicians complained that too often government departments could not answer 
simple but important questions about the populations that their policies were 
supposed to target – or benefit.  
More openness around data would increase the potential for research. A senior 
Whitehall policy maker described the attitude towards data: “the defaults are wrong in 
Whitehall. The principle is we hold on to it all and put out the odd bit when our arm is 
twisted”. There was also a feeling that the data problems had got worse since the 
loss of data discs by HMRC with Robert Chote, former director of the institute for 
Fiscal Studies, complaining: “as soon as the discs went missing when we were at 
IFS our ability to get any data from DWP without being in an armed compound to 
read it became very difficult”. Others also cited data protection as an issue but felt 
that “the reasons for not having data – resources or data protection—shouldn’t get in 
the way of a major big policy goal”.  
The government was now committed to opening up data. But that did not 
immediately translate into more useable data – and at our third seminar, Hadley 
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Beeman of LinkedGov, spelt out the implementation challenges for government and 
others in turning existing data sets into material that could help the public better 
understand what government was doing and hold it to account.  Those challenges 
reflect the different potential users and difference uses they will put data to. The 
issues she set out were:  
 “What and how to publish” which raised issues about redaction, how to ensure 
anonymity, how to deal with national security issues and how to deal with 
information which was currently charged for 
 Data of “varying degrees of quality, with different methodologies for different 
purposes...because we have data coming in from what amounts to tens of 
thousands of data teams cross the public sector it is coming in different 
formats with all sorts of different languages, budget codes and acronyms that 
are specific to that team” making it really hard for outsiders to work with the 
data  
 But even when data was available in a useable form, actually making use of it 
required “Technical skills [such as] accounting to make sense of data.” 
Much of the ‘new data’ becoming available through rapid feedback from service 
users and citizen scrutiny was enabled through the internet, but it was not clear that 
the public sector was well set up to use it. Conservative MP Nadhim Zahawi, founder 
of YouGov put it thus: ““we have to accept that UK has been notoriously poor at 
citizens’ feedback...it focuses on special interest groups and not talking to ordinary 
people and discussing their personal experiences of government and government 
services”. Internet driven cost reduction enabled a huge expansion in these potential 
sources of information. As Kate Ebbutt from Patient Opinion said: “The cost of 
feedback has dropped to almost nothing as it’s all online.” For a service like Channel 
4’s FactCheck, which scrutinises what politicians say and claim, cuts through 
“government obfuscation”, adjudicates election spats and helps its users navigate 
through complicated policy debates, much of their content was shaped by users. As 
Cathy Newman summed it up: “the readers and citizens helped to shape FactCheck.” 
But just as some policies were more amenable to testing and ’evidence basing’ than 
others, so there was a concern that the rise of more interactive data could be biased 
towards those who were digitally literate and more engaged. Speakers differed on 
the extent to which this was a problem. In the case of Patient Opinion, care was 
taken to make sure that there was a way of engaging service users who were not 
ready to give their feedback online. YouGov designed panels to be representative – 
despite differential internet usage. But Nadhim Zahawi dismissed the simple view 
that there was a big divide between the types of people who used the internet and 
those who did not. 
There was also some concern about the quality of this sort of data and how it related 
to more conventional metrics. Citizen feedback could be much timelier than the sort 
of results that would emerge from a formal study – but, as Geoff Mulgan pointed out, 
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“the plural of anecdote is not statistic, we don’t want just to aggregate anecdotes”. He 
did see the potential value of such feedback “…for the design of a very local service 
it may be the right thing to do.” Kate Ebbutt argued that “citizen feedback – in our 
case patient feedback - is an incredibly powerful took to improve, change and hold 
services accountable in a very transparent way”. Patient Opinion estimated that 10% 
of the issues raised by their respondents were translated into service improvements 
in the NHS. Cathy Newman also pointed to examples where FactCheck readers 
were able to produce instant evidence to refute ministerial claims, for example on 
whether work experience was ‘mandatory’ and on what lorry drivers were paid.  
There was some emerging evidence that feedback pointed in the same direction as 
more formal types of data. Dr. Felix Greaves from Imperial College pointed to 
research that suggested there was a correlation between citizen feedback on the 
NHS and more formal quality metrics: “Hospitals that patients rate well online tend to 
be the ones that have lower mortality rates and lower MRSA rates. It matches up 
quite well to the very expensive surveys that we do at the moment” – and he saw this 
as offering the potential to save resources.  
2.4. Conclusion  
The supply of data and evidence has already improved considerably – but more can 
clearly be done to address the barriers identified above. But the conclusion of the 
seminars (which mirrors a conclusion from separate Institute for Government work on 
the use of management information in government decision making8) is that the 
supply issues are secondary to the lack of demand for evidence and evaluation.   
                                              
8 Julian McCrae, Justine Stephen, Theresa Guermellou, Reema Mehta, Improving Decision 
Making in Whitehall, Institute for Government, May 2012 
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3. A problem of demand?  
Given that most people come into government to ‘make a difference’, the interesting 
question is why that does not translate into routine demand for evidence and 
evaluation. One audience member summed up what he thought the problem had 
been for education: “the issue was never high enough up the agenda of any of the 
multiple stakeholder leaders of the research of the academic community to the Civil 
Service or [in the case of education] of the teacher community”, though he detected a 
recent change in that “there seems to be greater interest now.” 
Many participants attributed the problem to the incentives facing individual decision 
makers. David Walker, formerly of the Audit Commission, said: “ unless we believe 
ministers behave irrationally, [the] incentive structure of ministers predisposes them 
against RCTs” and Hasan Bakhshi thought that problem applied more widely: “I think 
the problem is that the individuals who are the decision makers – who are deciding 
whether the individuals who are the decision makers, who are deciding whether an 
RCT is used to evaluate an intervention and whether an intervention is designed in a 
way that you can evaluate it using randomisation, those individuals often don’t have 
the incentives or the horizons – whether it’s to do with behavioural limitations or 
whether it’s to do with the fact that they’ve moved on before the results can come in 
– there often aren’t strong incentive structures in place to actually invest in this sort of 
intervention”.  
But politicians and civil servants were no longer the only ‘customers’ for evidence 
and evaluation in the new landscape of public services. As Gareth Davies from the 
Cabinet Office put it: “the real customers may be the frontline professionals. The 
customer may be the parents, with far more parent power in the system. It may be 
school academy chains. There is quite a broad range of people who could be the 
customer for this work in this new landscape of public services. That helps embed it 
– you are not reliant on the whim of a good secretary of state”. And a former minister 
refuted the idea that ministers were evaluation sceptics: “I don’t think any minister 
ever wanted less evaluation” but instead found the policy machine unresponsive 
continuing ”the frustration was trying to get the machine to tell you whether you were 
on a different planet or trying to do something that was quite possible”. 
In this section we look at the various reasons why policy makers – ministerial and 
official, but also at local level might or might not be interested in commissioning and 
using evidence and evaluation more routinely. The reasons that emerged in 
discussion were first about the issues facing ministers namely: 
 Problems with the timeliness and helpfulness of evidence and the 
mismatch between political timetables and the timelines of the evidence 
producers allied to ethical reservations about experimentation 
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 The fact that many political decisions were driven by values rather than 
outcomes – and that sometimes the ‘evidence-driven’ answer brought 
significant political risk 
A second set of issues related to civil servants and other public sector service 
providers. There was felt to be: 
 the lack of culture and skills for using rigorous evidence in the civil service 
 and a need to create openness to feedback among other service providers. 
Beyond those, there were players in the system who could be a force for better use 
of evidence and evaluation – but who were not yet playing that role enough. The 
seminars discussed:  
 the potential of the Treasury to create more powerful incentives for the use 
of evidence to back up spending decisions  
 the role of more local commissioners and of outside commentators in 
promoting better use of evidence. 
 
3.1. Timeliness and helpfulness of evidence to ministers 
Research and political timetables were potentially extremely out of step. Ministers 
wanted to take action quickly - whereas new research could take a long time to 
produce results. A politician gave a recent example of the timeliness problem: “I sat 
down with a research body the other day and they set out what they were planning to 
do. I said that ‘do you realise that by the time you reach your conclusions, it will be 
far too late to be of use to anybody. It will be great history, but it won’t help anyone 
make policy. You’re about to bid for funds – a six or nine month process. The policy 
will then need to be in place for it to have some time to work and generate an impact. 
You will then do your data collection, which is another six to nine months. You’ll then 
spend your twelve months thinking deep thoughts about it – and I’ll be the fisheries 
minister by then’”.   
Short tenure was a factor in defining ministerial time horizons – and there was a 
feeling that longer tenure would engender a different attitude to evidence and 
evaluation. There was a suggestion that ministers, knowing they have a short shelf 
life might be ‘impetuous’ looking for short-term benefit. The lower rate of ministerial 
turnover in the first couple of years of the coalition might be having a positive effect: 
“with longer tenure you do start to think of things you can see through to the end.”  
 Indeed ministers desire to make a quick impact meant that there was a risk that a 
proposal to look for evidence could be interpreted as obstructionism as another civil 
servant commented: “whenever you mention the word evaluation to ministers they 
feel we’re trying to slow them down and stop what they are trying to do”. That 
favoured both syntheses of existing research and international examples which might 
be immediately available as different sorts of what one participant called “fast-acting” 
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evidence which was the type most likely to be of use to politicians. Departments 
needed to be on top of their evidence base and anticipate likely interest from current 
and future ministers.   
There was another dimension of timeliness – for researchers/experts to be able to 
get in at the policy formulation stage before decisions had been made and options 
closed down. An academic participant commented that there was a problem here. 
While it might be most useful: “[to ]bring in evidence at open phase of policy process 
when minds were not decided – but that was the hardest phase for outsiders to 
access”.  
But even when evidence was available, it might not necessarily be helpful to 
decision-makers. Evidence could be ambiguous and the sort of caveated advice that 
academia often produced was not necessarily helpful for those who had to make a 
decision and did not have the luxury of avoiding or postponing a decision.  
3.2. The politics of evidence 
Participants – particularly the political participants – noted that it was wrong to 
discount the importance of values in politics. Geoff Mulgan noted that one reason for 
a reluctance to demand evidence “sometimes [politicians] don’t want [evidence] 
because it’s a values thing.” One political adviser pointed out that “Political 
leadership means politicians being responsive to the electorate who put them there 
in the first place” - and that if politicians failed to live up to the prospectus of on which 
they were elected, public trust would suffer. For example, it was pointed out that a 
minister might “believe in marriage”. If this was a values proposition, then measures 
to promote marriage would make good his promise and be what the public expected. 
But if he believed in marriage because it would reduce welfare dependency, that was 
a proposition that could be tested and reviewed in the light of evidence.  
 Another distinguished between types of policy, it was important to: distinguish 
between policies [which are] more fundamentally ideological and [those which are] 
more technocratic”. There was “scope for genuine consultation on the latter” but even 
then a decision had finally to be made:”I want to have a completely open mind for a 
period and then I want to do stuff.” 
Politicians and departments were not necessarily consistent in the approach they 
took to across their policy portfolio. For example, Jonathan Portes pointed out the 
example of Michael Gove and the Department for Education and saw: “Political 
schizophrenia on education… on one hand pursuing non evidence based policy on 
driving universal ‘academisation’ and free schools but also funding the Education 
Endowment Foundation an innovative and potentially very exciting challenge fund.” 
There were two other potential political problems – first, that the ‘evidence’ driven 
answer was politically dangerous. Politicians told us that they wanted “to know the 
difference something is going to make”. But there was also the risk of really 
inconvenient truths. As one politician pointed out “problems came when evaluations 
recommended policies you thought would mean you lose your job”. There were 
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areas, such as hospital closures where robust evidence pointed very strongly in one 
direction – towards amalgamation of services - but local opinion was hostile and 
tactical oppositions could make life impossible for government ministers who 
supported unpopular decisions. In those cases evidence did very little to sway public 
opinion.  
There was also potential concern about the ethics and political acceptability of 
experimentation on people. A senior civil servant pointed out that “No one likes doing 
trials of social policy on people for perfectly understandable reasons” and Kevan 
Collins pointed to the problems in appearing to deny a beneficial intervention to 
children during their one opportunity in the education system. But Rachel Glennerster 
thought there were “very few places where you can’t design something that isn’t 
ethical” – she gave an example of French schemes to help the young unemployed 
where no one was denied the service. But when high intensity and low intensity 
interventions were tested she thought it was less ethical to proceed with a policy at 
national scale without trying to test its efficacy first. Jonathan Portes similarly thought 
ethically acceptable experiments could be designed in areas such as criminal justice 
and immigration policy.  
3.3. The skills, behaviour and culture of civil servants  
There were concerns that civil servants lacked the skills, behaviour and culture to 
provide the basis for a more analytic approach to government problem solving. That 
started with senior leaders in departments but heads of analysis had a particular role 
to play in ensuring departmental capability to use evidence well. In the seminars the 
variation in culture around use of evidence was noted – the Department of Work and 
Pensions was traditionally strong on analysis; Department for Transport had highly 
developed methods for appraisal but was weaker on evaluation.  
There were various ideas at the seminars on how to influence the senior leaders in 
departments. Noting the impact that capability reviews had had, one speaker 
suggested league tables for evidence use with naming and shaming of departments 
that were weak on evidence. This might influence civil servants as the capability 
reviews had done – but not necessarily ministers, as one politician put it: “the idea 
that a learned ranking of policy evaluation would scratch the surface of a hard-bitten 
minister seems unlikely to me.” Other participants suggested that it might be 
important to look at the incentives on permanent secretaries in their role as 
departmental accounting officers: this is something that the Institute for Government 
has already proposed in Making Policy Better and which is also reflected in the Civil 
Service Reform Plan. One of the powerful incentives on permanent secretaries is 
already the need to defend decisions to the Public Accounts Committee, and that 
could be a powerful motivator to invest in evidence and evaluation, but only if the 
connection was clear. One chief analyst explained that how he missed that 
opportunity:”I don’t think I did enough to explain to the permanent secretary how 
potentially evaluation, good evaluation, could help him manage the risks of sitting in 
front of the PAC and explaining whether something was value for money or not. That 
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is a question of analysts understanding what is going to get the attention of their 
permanent secretary”.  
Civil servants needed to think imaginatively about ways to bring evidence into the 
policy process – rather than simply accept it was incompatible with political decision-
making timetables. Civil servants were often too reluctant to challenge ministers 
either on basing decisions on evidence or on how to test emerging results. Former 
civil servant and development specialist Owen Barder thought that: “a lot of the policy 
making community and especially the British Civil Service is far too self-confident 
about what they know and what they don’t know” and that civil servants should take a 
lot of the responsibility for the underuse of evidence in policy making. Other policy 
makers needed to ensure “specialists were in the room” and that their role was 
valued. In turn those specialists needed to be on top of the existing evidence base 
but also be “regularly in touch with academics and outside experts”. Chief analysts 
had an important role in making sure the policy logic was clear. As one speaker put 
it: “when you’ve got a tricky policy problem...put it in a spreadsheet, and see what 
assumptions you are making about the effects of your policy levers on outputs and 
outcomes in three years time. If you have made some heroic assumptions, at least 
be transparent about them and be clear where the biggest gaps in your 
understanding are”.  
Another block speakers identified was both the lack of skills to use data and other 
emerging forms of feedback and the willingness (alongside other service providers) 
to be open to using it to improve policies or services rather than be resistant and 
defensive. And a number of speakers identified the problem created by too rapid 
turnover in the Civil Service, with a civil service speaker contrasting with greater (pre-
reshuffle) stability among ministers: “the more permanent civil service may be more 
impermanent”. This meant policy makers lacked both detailed knowledge of areas 
themselves, incentives to invest in the evidence base and the relationships that 
would enable them to access external expertise. On the other hand, Rachel 
Glennerster felt that the longevity of civil servants gave them a particular duty to 
ensure that processes were put in place to learn from policies – so they could answer 
questions from future ministers: “the civil service here is an incredible resource. 
People do have long careers in the civil service; they acre and they have a lot more 
influence than in other countries. They also have a particular responsibility for trying 
to put things in place which will generate these lessons so that next time a minister 
asks them what the evidence is, they have something to say”.  
Nadhim Zahawi thought culture was also to blame for civil service reluctance to 
engage with more direct citizen involvement in policy making: “civil servants are very 
wary of this kind of service and actually place barriers that we all need to knock 
down. The reason is natural: their fear is that this would become another tool for the 
obsessive activist. It seems to me that at the moment most public feedback leads to 
those who shout loudest getting the most attention despite the fact that a large silent 
majority may think very differently about an issue”.  
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But even if Whitehall became more open (“sensitised”) to new and diverse sources of 
feedback, there could still be a resource and skills barrier in knowing how to use that 
information as a member of the audience pointed out: “ [there is a ] resource issue on 
processing side . [I am] not sure the skills exist within government to do the same for 
this information we get via these alternate means.” 
3.4. Openness to evidence and feedback among service 
providers 
A more decentralised service landscape creates shorter feedback loops and means 
that there are many more potential users of evidence and feedback. Kevan Collins 
thought that the prime users of the evidence emerging from the experiments 
commissioned by the Education Endowment Foundation were not necessarily policy 
makers sitting in Department for Education but rather “the experts I am talking about 
are the practitioners, teachers, those who are in the lives of children” and the EEF’s 
was to equip them with the knowledge they needed to improve the professional job 
they were doing.  
Kate Ebbutt noted a change in the way in which the NHS engaged with the feedback 
emerging from Patient Opinion and saw a change in culture underway – from 
defensiveness to a willingness to move toward more service co-design: “the first 
reaction from all NHS providers to any feedback is to freak out...when we first started 
in the NHS if you said to someone there that you wanted to publish some feedback 
about one of their services, everyone would probably have fainted...the first 
responses we got from the NHS publically was to say “please contact our press 
department”. The shift has been cultural rather than about policy.” She explained 
how that culture shift came about: “you get it to the person who delivers the care and 
manages the ward and give them the training to be able to respond... give freedom to 
the staff members to do it, change it, and tell everyone else about it, then that really 
changes the way your staff feel about and it reduces the cost hugely”.  
But for both civil servants and practitioners there could be resource consequences, 
as Cathy Newman pointed out: “the new interactive world is great for consumers, but 
it produces a whole load of extra work for practitioners.” 
3.5. Incentives and the role of the Treasury 
There was general agreement that there were no consistent and powerful incentives 
on ministers or civil servants to be rigorous in evidence use and evaluation. 
Departments had very different approaches and emerging NAO evidence suggested 
that they spent very different amounts on evidence and evaluation particular on the 
cost-effectiveness of policies. The National Audit Office itself was more interested in 
audit than in evaluation.  
Participants thought that the Treasury ought to play a key role in incentivising 
departments to commission and use good evaluations– but that it probably played 
that role less than it should, perhaps because Treasury spending teams spent more 
time mediating between competing departmental priorities than focusing on the cost 
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effectiveness of what money was spent on. There was no sense that “the better your 
evidence, the more money we’ll give you”. There was a suggestion that this could be 
changed and could change incentives “make ministers think that if they commit to 
evaluating stuff more rigorously it’s more likely that their budget will increase than it 
they don’t – they will be able to demonstrate both to the Treasury and more 
importantly to the public and political class that they deserve more money. 
Unfortunately that is not the way our political dynamic works most of the time.” That 
sort of mentality could “create a positive feedback loop.” 
The feeling that the Treasury needed to exert some external discipline was part of a 
more general frustration at the quality of internal performance management and use 
of information within departments. Ministers were interested in seeing that their 
policies were having an effect – but too often departments were not in a position to 
give them the information they needed on what impact policies were having – and 
this could be frustrate them. This issue came up in our second seminar with one 
political speaker bemoaning the fact that: “we have these interim targets because 
they are the things we can measure...but what we don’t have is any actual monitoring 
of what we are trying to achieve, how we are doing against it, how things changing in 
the world are changing our performance.” Another political speaker contrasted this 
with the position in a private sector company: “if government really understood the 
outputs it was trying to achieve then it should be routinely working out the best value 
for money way of achieving them, in the same way as a corporate has a strategic 
department that is constantly process-innovating all the time. … some Whitehall 
departments don’t do that in as serious way as they should…It is extremely hard...but 
that has to be the answer”. 
More rigorous policy evaluation was particularly important in a time of budget 
restraint – underperforming schemes could and should be killed off. But there was 
reluctance often by policy makers to ask the question – Hasan Bakhshi noted that: “it 
was very difficult to persuade government to do randomisation on business support 
schemes”. Perhaps one reason was that when NESTA did a rigorous evaluation of a 
scheme, it showed little impact.  
3.6. The role of local commissioners and outside commentators 
Local commissioners had an important role to play – both as consumers of evidence 
and as commissioners. Gerry Stoker thought that local experimentation offered a 
potential way forward – in a country where there was already “too much national 
everything... you can do randomised control trials but you don’t need to do them big 
scale, you can do them small scale working with people in the field”. The NESTA 
Creative Credits pilot had been commissioned locally, not nationally. Another 
participant pointed out that there was a lot of private sector testing – but the insights 
were not necessarily shared. Former FT Pubic Policy Editor Nick Timmins a pointed 
out that while the track record of large-scale RCTs in the United States in influencing 
policy was relatively limited there was a lot of learning there from “natural 
experiments” as states adopted different approaches to tackling social problems. 
However others were not as convinced. Rachel Glennerster pointed to a danger of 
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fragmentation. She saw a “risk of coordination failure” and a need to make sure 
results are disseminated. 
While local commissioners could create demand for better evidence, external 
commentators could increase the incentives for policy makers to be more robust in 
their use of evidence by scrutinising the evidential base for decisions. As one 
participant put it: “it would be good if there were more people like Ben Goldacre out 
there”.  But opinions differed on whether the more direct and fast interaction between 
policy makers and external commentators had changed more than the speed at 
which those interactions took place. While Cathy Newman could point to a new 
community of people able to act through FactCheck to expose unsupported claims 
by politicians – or simply ask for clarification of unclear policies, with more “evidence 
based commentary”, politicians were more sceptical about thinking that the quality of 
scrutiny had improved, doubting “the idea that internet is source of truth and beauty”. 
3.7. Conclusion 
The cumulative impact of these demand side barriers is that evidence and evaluation 
are used less well and less often than they should be. In a later section we look at 
possible changes that could increase the incentives on policy makers to use 
evidence more systematically. But a consistent theme was that institutional change 
had the potential to be a powerful force for change both in increasing the supply of 
good evidence and in increasing demand and addressing the “time inconsistencies” 
that influenced policy makers.   
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4. The role of ‘evidence’ institutions 
The fourth seminar focused particularly on the potential of evidence institutions – but 
the issue surfaced from the first session when Hasan Bakhshi argued that 
institutional change had a role to play in offsetting the bias to short-termism if it were 
possible to “create an institution which credibly has the ear of the decision makers, 
the minister, which is independent enough to genuinely evaluate the impacts and is 
well-resourced”. Owen Barder of the Centre for Global Development concurred, 
asking “what could we be doing to institutionalise this, not in the form of persuading 
politicians its important but building it into our institutions and systems to make it a 
requirement as part of government as say NICE is in health?” The Cabinet Office is 
already exploring the potential of a ‘what works’ institute – often referred to as a 
NICE for social policy.   
In the seminars speakers gave examples of institutions that were changing the 
evidence landscape. The MIT Poverty Lab was setting a benchmark for evaluation in 
development policy and its French offshoot was doing the same for evaluating 
employment interventions. These institutions were led by policy engaged academics.  
At the other end of the spectrum was the Dutch National Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (CPB). This was established in the late 1940s to do both macroeconomic 
forecasting but also evaluate both government and opposition policies. It now played 
a key role looking at the election platforms of political parties. Director Dr. Coen 
Teulings pointed out their lack of formal independence: “we are part of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. We are not an agency or an independent body. We are formally 
part of the ministry and I am just a civil servant, appointed by the cabinet”. The 
director of the CPB was able to comment publically on government policy and the 
reputation of the CPB (Teulings said: “our reputation is enormous”) meant those 
comments carried significant weight. Robert Chote, director of the UK’s Office for 
Budget Responsibility, pointed to the paradox of the CPB: “The CPB is probably the 
least formally independent watchdog but with one of the greatest reputations for 
independence that you could wish to find.” 
The CPB has a sizeable staff of 100-150 people to allow it to perform its tasks. If the 
opposition asked the CPB to look at a policy the CPB would only publish that 
evaluation if the opposition used it. Teulings pointed to a recent innovation: 
“Parliament can ask us questions, they can ask us to evaluate something.” In order 
to protect its reputation the CPB would “only intervene in budget debates when 
specially asked”. The evaluation of election platforms – an offer taken up by all but a 
couple of single member minority parties meant voters could compare platforms 
assessed against a standard scenario – and that in turn would provide the basis for 
the subsequent coalition negotiations. There were some areas where the CPB had to 
make an estimate – eg on the feasible size of civil service reductions, which all 
parties would then adopt. Teulings admitted that such cases the CPB was “tak[ing] a 
stance even though a purely political judgement”. But it was not the CPB’s role to 
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make decisions for voters: “We provide arguments and what voters do with the 
arguments is their job.” 
The nearest UK equivalent, the newly established Office for Budget Responsibility 
(OBR) is formally much more independent than the CPB – but needed to be because 
it could not rely on decades of earned reputation. However its remit was more 
circumscribed. As Robert Chote explained its legislation precluded it from looking at 
alternative or opposition policies. He saw a case for extending the OBR remit – but 
noted the very different staffing levels meant that either OBR would have to expand 
significantly or the role of the Civil Service would have to change with the OBR 
overseeing civil service evaluations of opposition policy. But the OBR needed to build 
credibility just as the CPB had – and transparency was crucial. Robert Chote 
explained that “we have to show our working” and be “as transparent as we can 
possibly be”. 
Alongside the OBR, another coalition innovation has been the establishment of the 
Educational Endowment Foundation, singled out by Jonathan Portes as an 
encouraging development at the first seminar. This is a charity, not an NDPB, and 
was established in response to a competitive tender process by Department for 
Education and given a ten year grant. Its Chief Executive, Dr Kevan Collins 
explained its approach and governance. The money will be used to “evaluate, 
support, rigorously understand and build the evidence base of what works to raise 
the attainment of our lowest performing...and most disadvantaged children...The 
approach the government has taken, which has widespread support, is to create an 
independent organisation, with significant resources in education terms to have a 
look at this question, to try and back what works. To go to the independence point, 
there is no one from DfE on the Board, there are no politicians on the board; it is an 
independent organisation supported by a couple of charities that got together and 
won the tender to do the job”. The target for the evidence produced by EEF was 
practitioners rather than policy makers.  
As noted above though, the EEF has a significant budget and independent remit – 
but is only tasked at looking at one specific part of education policy. The CPB can 
also do more general evaluations of specific social policy areas, such as education. 
Another model of independent evaluation office is the Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy whose director, Steve Aos spoke at a private seminar at IFG9. In a 
system with a strong legislature and weak executive the small institute (only 11 
people) can be commissioned by legislators to produce evidence syntheses across a 
range of social policy issues (and is now extending its remit) and the Director 
regularly testifies before committees. Aos himself has been director since its 
foundation in the 1980s. He told the seminar that the measure of their success is the 
extent to which legislators are prepared to allocate resources to commission 
evidence – and at a time of falling budgets their commissions were increasing. But 
                                              
9 Reported at http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/4394/what-works-in-government-
%e2%80%93-lessons-from-the-other-washington/  
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he was also clear on the limits of demand – he reckoned they were asked for advice 
on roughly a third of relevant policy proposals – and which, as in baseball, was a 
pretty good batting average.  
4.1. Embedding better use of evidence and evaluation  
Through the four sessions some of the possible building blocks of a new system, 
more conducive to better use of evidence and evaluation emerged. Some are 
already in place – albeit patchily; others are under discussion; in some cases there 
are moves in the right direction – for others to happen, changes need to be made. It 
is clear that simply looking at one part of the system is not enough – if evidence and 
evaluation is to be more systematically embedded in the system there needs to be 
changes in the incentives and behaviours of the actors in the system. 
There are clearly changes that can be made at a number of points which have the 
potential to both improve the supply of evidence and better embed demand. The 
emphasis in the Civil Service Reform Plan on the permanent secretary’s 
responsibility to ensure that decisions are based on sound evidence may make a 
difference, as may the pressure of continued austerity in forcing departments to look 
at impact and commissioners to seek evidence of what works and take account of 
citizen feedback. Within departments, heads of policy and analysis need to ensure 
not only that policies are implemented in ways which can be evaluated but also that 
departments are on top of the evidence base across their areas of responsibilities so 
that they are ready to engage with ministers. In Making Policy Better we 
recommended the creation of a coordinating unit under a Policy Director to help plan 
the department’s policy work and this would be an important part of their role. 
Meanwhile the rise of ad hoc external scrutineers may force better discipline in the 
use of ’facts’ to justify policy changes. More policy engaged academics with a good 
understanding of the policy process and able to engage effectively with senior 
decision makers can improve the supply side. Others, including Parliament, have a 
potential role to play. 
One issue that got less attention than might have been expected was the adversarial 
use of evidence within the UK system – both to win interdepartmental battles and 
then to win public and political arguments. Rather than provide an objective 
assessment of a problem, the most promising intervention or of the performance of a 
programme, evidence becomes part of political and policy conflict.  
Independent ‘evidence’ institutions are one way of ’depoliticising‘ evidence and 
taking it above the political battleground – that was the rationale for the 
establishment of NICE and the Office for Budget Responsibility.  
In the seminars we heard about different models – the Dutch Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (CPB); the Education Endowment Foundation and the Office for Budget 
Responsibility as well as such influential evidence institutions as the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy. There was clearly no ‘one size fits all’ model: different governmental 
systems meant there were different points of access and their impact also depended 
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on how much of the policy process they were allowed to influence, on the pre-
existing evidence base they could draw on and on their own institutional reputation. 
But it was possible to distinguish certain essential ‘design features’ which were 
critical to the institutions ability to perform their role. These are:  
 Institutions need independence and credibility to perform this function.  
There are different ways of achieving this: they can have governance 
arrangements which are either cross-party (in the case for instance of the 
Washington State Institute) or non-partisan (as in the case of the EEF). 
Members of the Budget Responsibility Council are, uniquely for this sort of 
non-departmental public body, subject not just to the normal pre-appointment 
hearings for important public body appointments but to confirmation by the 
Treasury Select Committee.  
 One way to establish independence and credibility is through longevity – with 
time to build both institutional reputation and for the leadership to embody 
that reputation. As we saw, the CPB had no formal independence – but its 
long track record and the long tenure of its director meant that its reputation 
was such that it could act very independently. Similarly NICE has benefited 
from the long tenure of its chair and chief executive who have both been there 
since foundation and has built an established track record which means 
ministers rarely intervene. Newer institutions need more formal independence 
while they build their reputation.  
 Transparency is a critical part of that reputation building. External evidence 
bodies need, as Robert Chote said, to “be prepared to show their workings” 
and to subject themselves to regular peer review and external scrutiny.  
 Resourcing models also need to underline that independence – the EEF is 
funded on an endowment basis with a ten year grant from Department for 
Education; the OBR has a ring-fenced budget to make sure the Treasury 
cannot neuter it by cutting back its resources. The Washington State Institute 
has a different funding model reflecting demands for its services.  
 They need to be able to access both internal government information and 
draw on – or create – a robust evidence base. The OBR differs from the 
institute for Fiscal Studies in its ability to access HMRC and DWP information.  
NICE draws on the wealth of data from required clinical drug trials to decide 
what are cost-effective treatments for the NHS.  The EEF on the other hand is 
set up to both create and disseminate a new evidence base about effective 
emerging interventions.  
 They need to be clearly linked into the policy process – ideally both for 
government and opposition policy making. There is a danger that outsourcing 
evaluation or evidence gathering and putting it into a separate part of the 
system reduces influence on policy design and delivery. Different institutions 
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will have different ways of affecting the policy process: with direct decision-
making as with NICE, through being part of the scrutiny process as with CPB 
and OBR, or by the production of evidence for legislators or practitioners as 
with Washington State Institute. But in each case the institution needs a clear 
view of how it ties into the policy process and how it expects the information it 
produces to be used.  
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5. Conclusion 
Changes to the incentives and operating frameworks of the individual players can 
come together to create a system in which policies are both developed on a firmer 
basis and modified and abandoned when they do not have the desired impact – the 
‘test, learn and adapt’ model being developed by the Cabinet Office’s behavioural 
insight team. It is possible to see how the creation of an external evidence institution 
can both increase the supply of good evidence but also increase the potential 
scrutiny of policy decisions, thus changing the incentives both of ministers or local 
commissioners and of the civil servants working for them. Or how more direct public 
feedback on performance can lead to service redesign and influence practitioners to 
look for evidence on ‘what works’.  
But crucial to any system redesign is demand from the ultimate decision makers for 
better evidence and evaluation. Just as our report on Informed Decision Making 
found that the dominance of the policy culture at the top of Whitehall means that 
there is little demand for the rigorous sort of management information that 
businesses use to improve performance, so the generalist culture of policy making 
underplays the use and usefulness of analysis in helping make better policy. The 
highly adversarial nature of policy making – both internally between government 
departments and in Parliament – means evidence and evaluation are too often seen 
and used as ammunition to win political arguments.  
One of the challenges is to move beyond the more ‘technocratic’ end of the policy 
spectrum into more ‘political’ or ideological areas. For that, proper evaluation needs 
to be seen as the friend – not the enemy – of the radical politician trying to make 
permanent change. Rachel Glennerster gave an example of how a desire to make a 
policy change survive a change of administration persuaded the Mexican 
government to opt for a rigorous evaluation:  
“if you think about one of the most famous, early randomised impact evaluations, 
Progresa, the incentives for politicians were why they did the randomised trial. You 
had a government that thought they were going to lose the next election, and they 
wanted the legacy to continue. And they knew their programme...might well be 
overturned unless they put in place something to save it. And what they put in place 
to save it was a randomised control trial because they knew when the results came 
out, and if those results were positive, it would be very hard for the next government 
to overturn it.”  
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Annex A 
Participants in the Making Policy Better: use of evidence and evaluation in policy 
making series: 
Seminar 1: the randomisation revolution 
Dr. Rachel Glennerster - Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Laboratory at MIT.  
Jonathan Portes - Director, National Institute of and Social Research, former 
Chief Economist, Cabinet Office 
Hasan Bakhshi - Director, Creative Industries, Policy and Research, NESTA 
Seminar 2: good policy, bad politics 
Michael Kell, Chief Economist, National Audit Office, 
Steve Webb MP, Minister for Pensions 
Sharon White, Director General, Public Spending, HM Treasury 
Kitty Ussher, Smith Institute 
Seminar 3: armchair evaluators 
Nadhim Zahawi MP - MP for Stratford-on-Avon, Co founder & CEO of 
YouGov PLC 2000 – February 2010. 
Cathy Newman - Channel 4 News presenter who runs the FactCheck blog. 
Kate Ebbutt -  Patient Opinion  
Hadley Beeman - Technology Strategy Board and founder of LinkedGov 
Geoff Mulgan - Chief executive, NESTA 
Seminar 4: are independent evaluation offices the answer?  
Dr Coen Teulings, Director, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB).  
Robert Chote, Director, Office for Budget Responsibility.  
Dr. Kevan Collins, Chief Executive, Education Endowment Fund. 
Gareth Davies, Executive Director, Strategy and Civil Society, Cabinet Office.  
